Shaohua Wei and Huang Ding

Corresponding author:
Huang Ding, Public Administration School, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Administration Building, Qingshuihe Campus, University
of Electronic Science and Technology of China, 2006 Xiyuan Avenue, Pidu District, Chengdu, Sichuan 611730, China.
School of Political Science and Public Administration, Wuhan University, Wuchang District, Wuhan, Hubei 430072, China.
Email: dhwuda@126.com

doi: 10.18278/cpj.4.1.4

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Abstract
As a central institutional arrangement for promoting local policy innovation in China, policy demonstrations increasingly feature cross-level collaboration by central guidance. This process involves strategic interactions among provincial, municipal, and district governments rather than mere top-down implementation. However, the existing research has insufficiently examined how these cross-level interactions evolve dynamically. To address this literature gap, this study develops an evolutionary game model of provincial, municipal and district governments to analyze their strategic interactions and to identify evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) under varying incentive and constraint conditions. Numerical simulations illustrate the emergence and evolution of collaborative dynamics. We further validate the model in the case study of City S and reveal the organizational mechanisms shaping collaborative policy demonstration. The findings suggest that provincial governments provide structural leadership, municipal governments function as coordination hubs, and district governments’ cooperation is strongly shaped by grassroots feedback. Effective and sustainable cross-level collaboration hinges on positive incentives and institutionalized resource coordination. This research provides a dynamic theoretical lens for understanding the mechanism of cross-level collaboration in China’s policy demonstrations and offers practical insights for the development of sustainable and robust policy innovation in local governments.

Keywords: Cross-Level Government Relations; Policy Demonstrations; Evolutionary Game Theory; Case Analysis